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The Impact of the GI Bill on Legal Education: 
A Case Study of 
Boston College Law School, 1949-1959 
 
Brandon L. Bigelow 
 
  
Introduction 
Founded in 1929 at Eleven Beacon Street in 
downtown Boston, Boston College Law School promised 
“to prepare young men and women of intelligence, 
industry and character, for careers in public service 
in the administration of justice.”1  It was, from the 
outset, a school of uncommon vision and ideals with a 
uniquely Catholic outlook: “the Boston College Law 
School is dedicated to the philosophy that there is in 
fact an objective moral order, to which human beings 
and civil societies are bound in conscience to 
conform.”2  Among the most important features to 
founding Dean Dennis A. Dooley was a fully-accredited 
night school, something sorely missing in Boston, so 
that working students could one day realize their 
ambitions to leave their daily jobs to practice law 
anywhere in the country.3 
                                                          
1
 See, e.g., BOSTON COLLEGE BULLETIN: UNIVERSITY CATALOGUE 354 (Nov. 1953) 
[hereinafter 1953 BULLETIN]. 
2
 See, e.g., id. 
3
 See TODD F. SIMON, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL AFTER FIFTY YEARS: AN INFORMAL 
HISTORY, 1929-1979, at 5 (1980). 
2 
 
Even as the Depression set in, the law school 
made steady progress.  Dean Dooley and the law 
school’s regent, Reverend John B. Creeden, S.J., 
enforced such rigorous academic standards that fifty 
percent of the first class either quit or flunked out.4  
These exacting standards paid dividends three years 
later, however, when the American Bar Association 
(“ABA”) granted accreditation to the law school with 
the first graduating class.5  Membership in the 
Association of American Law Schools (“AALS”) followed 
in 1937.6  In 1938, with a student enrollment of 382, 
the law school ranked as the thirteenth largest in the 
country.7 
By October 1941, Boston College Law School -- 
then located at 441 Stuart Street in Boston -- enjoyed 
an increasingly influential position in the Boston 
legal community.8  In that year and for many years to 
follow, the law school sponsored the “Red Mass” to 
                                                          
4
 See id. at 9-10. 
5
 See DAVID R. DUNIGAN, S.J., A HISTORY OF BOSTON COLLEGE 253 (1947).  To 
appreciate the importance of this accomplishment, witness the 
modern struggle of schools like the Massachusetts School of Law, 
which continues to operate without ABA accreditation years after 
its founding.  See, e.g., David Bushnell, School Tries New Tactic 
Against ABA, BOSTON GLOBE, July 26, 1998, at D4; Mass. School of 
Law v. American Bar Assn., 142 F.3d 26, 30-32 (1st Cir. 1998)  
(detailing accreditation process and efforts by Massachusetts 
School of Law to receive accreditation). 
6
 See DUNIGAN, supra note 5, at 253. 
7
 See SIMON, supra note 3, at 16. 
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mark the opening of the judicial year.9  The mass, 
delivered by the dean of the law school, Reverend 
William J. Kenealy, drew some of the state’s most 
prominent leaders, including the governor, the chief 
justice and entire bench of the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts, the attorney general, and the U.S. 
attorney.10  Under Father Kenealy’s inspired 
leadership, “[p]lans were discussed and formulated for 
broadening the influence of the school in all fields 
of legal action –- judicial, administrative and 
legislative . . . . The future was indeed bright -– 
and then came Pearl Harbor.”11 
Although World War II presented challenging times 
for Boston College -- and indeed, nearly destroyed the 
law school -– the post-war period also presented 
unique opportunities.  Returning veterans, flush with 
money provided by the federal government through the 
Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 –- the so-called 
“GI Bill of Rights” or simply the “GI Bill” -- 
financed an ambitious transformation of Boston College 
                                                                                                                                                              
8
 See DUNIGAN, supra note 5, at 284. 
9
 See id. 
10
 See id. 
11
 See Cornelius J. Moynihan et al., War-Time Report of the 
Faculty Advisory Committee (August 1945), in William J. Kenealy, 
S.J., General Report on the Condition of the Law School, 
Preliminary Report, Oct. 8, 1952, at A-4 (on file at Boston 
College Burns Library). 
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Law School from a well-respected regional school to 
one of national stature.  While the character of the 
law school changed radically during these years, the 
stated mission of the law school remained the same –- 
to provide training for young lawyers who wanted to do 
some good in the world. 
The impact of the GI Bill on legal education has 
never been explored, although such a study provides 
unique insight into very modern issues.  This Article 
presents a case study of Boston College Law School, an 
institution that changed dramatically in the decade 
and a half immediately following World War II.  Part I 
explains the evolution of the GI Bill and the impact 
this federal education program had upon Boston College 
Law School.12  Among the most important features of the 
GI Bill was the rigid insistence that veterans not 
incur any debt to finance their education.  Part II 
traces the development of the Veterans’ Readjustment 
Assistance Act of 1952 -- the “Korean GI Bill” -- a 
profoundly different program both in its conception 
and application.13  The experience of Korean War 
veterans at Boston College Law School, and their 
migration from regular daytime students to working 
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night school students, demonstrates the impact of 
rising tuition costs that exceed a student’s ability 
to pay.  Part III examines the expansion of federal 
student loans, inspired by the successes of the two GI 
Bills.14  It concludes that although the transition 
from a regional to a national law school was a worthy 
goal, Boston College Law School –- indeed, legal 
education as a whole –- missed an opportunity to bring 
the ideals of the law school and the profession more 
closely in alignment.  In short, federal student loans 
do not relieve private law schools of a continuing 
obligation to expand access to legal education for 
those who cannot otherwise afford to pursue careers in 
the law. 
 
I. The Original GI Bill 
and the Impact of Returning Veterans on Legal 
Education 
 
When President Franklin D. Roosevelt first urged 
Congress in 1943 to provide educational benefits for 
veterans returning from World War II, he had far more 
pragmatic reasons for the suggestion than the “special 
and continuing obligation to these men and women in 
                                                                                                                                                              
12
 See infra notes 15-76 and accompanying text. 
13
 See infra notes 77-126 and accompanying text. 
14
 See infra notes 127-157 and accompanying text. 
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the armed services” to which he adverted.15  Only 
eleven years had passed since the “Bonus Army” of 
20,000 unemployed World War I veterans marched on 
Washington D.C. to demand early payment of a cash 
bonus promised by the federal government.  The march 
precipitated a crisis compelling President Herbert 
Hoover to call out the Army –- under the command of 
General Douglas MacArthur and including two young 
majors named Eisenhower and Marshall -- to bring peace 
to the nation’s capital.  As to World War II veterans, 
Congressman Hamilton Fish of New York warned that if 
veterans “come home and sell apples as they did after 
the last war . . . I believe we would have chaotic and 
revolutionary conditions in America.”16 
In November 1942, as casualties mounted in the 
bloody fight on Guadalcanal in the Pacific and the 
Allies scored their first tentative victories in North 
Africa, the need for more conscripts became painfully 
clear.  Signing into law an amendment to the Selective 
Service Act that expanded the draft to eighteen and 
                                                          
15
 Preliminary Report of the Armed Forces Committee on Post-War 
Educational Opportunities for Service Personnel, H.R. DOC. NO. 78-
344, at 1 (1943). 
16
 MILTON GREENBERG, THE GI BILL: THE LAW THAT CHANGED AMERICA 11 (1997) 
(citation omitted) [hereinafter GREENBERG, THE GI BILL].  Professor 
Greenberg’s book is a companion to an excellent video documentary 
on the experience of returning veterans and the long-term impact 
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nineteen year olds, President Roosevelt promised 
parents that these young men would be able to resume 
their education when they returned from war.17  He 
commissioned a study by a committee of educators and 
military officers “for the taking of steps to enable 
young men whose education has been interrupted to 
resume their schooling . . . after their service in 
the armed forces has come to an end.”18  The Armed 
Forces Committee on Post-War Educational Opportunities 
for Service Personnel –- called the “Osborn Committee” 
after its director, Brigadier General Frederick H. 
Osborn –- included among its members Young B. Smith, 
the dean of Columbia University Law School.19 
The Osborn Committee, perceiving that the problem 
of returning troops was already upon the country and 
that any effective program would require tremendous 
lead time and coordination, wasted no time in tackling 
the question.  In July 1943, less than nine months 
after first meeting and with Allied troops making 
their first successful landings in Italy, the 
committee submitted a preliminary report to President 
                                                                                                                                                              
of the GI Bill on American society, THE GI BILL: THE LAW THAT CHANGED 
AMERICA (PBS Home Video 1997). 
17
 See H.R. DOC. NO. 78-344, supra note 15, at 4. 
18
 See id. 
19
 See id. 
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Roosevelt.20  In that report, the Osborn Committee 
recommended that the federal government provide each 
man and woman who had served six months or more during 
the war one year of education or training, along with 
a living allowance to encourage veterans to take 
advantage of educational opportunities.21  Further, the 
committee recommended that a limited number of 
exceptional veterans be permitted to pursue up to 
three more years of education.22 
Although the committee focused upon the problem 
presented by the president, “the aggregate educational 
shortages which are being created by the war,”23 the 
committee was keenly aware that a comprehensive plan 
would be required to cushion the blow to the domestic 
economy as a projected 12,000,000 veterans demobilized 
at the end of the war.24  The committee reminded the 
president that the cost of maintaining a veteran at an 
educational institution would be far less than that of 
                                                          
20
 See id. at 4-15. 
21
 See id. at 8-9. 
22
 See H.R. DOC. NO. 78-344, supra note 15, at 9. 
23
 See id. at 6. 
24
 See id. at 9 (“[I]n making it possible for all members of the 
Army and Navy with 6 months or more to pursue an education course 
for a year after their discharge, we also recognize that such an 
arrangement would simplify the problems of demobilizing our armed 
forces.”). 
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maintaining that same person on active duty.25  While 
nobody could be certain how many veterans would take 
advantage of these opportunities, the committee 
thought that a minimum of 1,000,000 men and women 
would apply for the first year benefits, while only 
150,000-200,000 would continue on for a second, third 
or fourth year of school.26 
 In weighing the possible programs for financing 
post-war education, the Osborn Committee explicitly 
rejected debt financing or need-based grants: 
We have rejected both a program based chiefly on 
loans and a program making financial grants 
contingent on a showing of need, because we have 
concluded that either of these programs would 
discourage many of the ex-service people most 
capable of helping to overcome the national 
education deficit, from doing so.  With respect 
to loans in particular, we have believed that a 
program which would saddle young men and women 
with relatively heavy indebtedness at the outset 
of their careers would (even if they would accept 
it, as many of them would not) be of doubtful 
wisdom.27 
 
The committee thought this an undesirable outcome, 
particularly in the case of those veterans willing and 
able to attend professional or postgraduate schools 
                                                          
25
 See id. at 10 (“The total cost to the Government of maintaining 
a man in an educational institution for 1 year will be 
approximately $900.  The estimated cost of maintaining an 
enlisted man on active duty for 1 year . . . is approximately 
$1,500.”). 
26
 See id. 
27
 See H.R. DOC. NO. 78-344, supra note 15, at 11. 
10 
 
for two to three years before filling an important 
niche in post-war American society.28 
 President Roosevelt enthusiastically endorsed the 
report and referred it to Congress in October 1943.29  
By that time, however, the initiative had shifted to 
the American Legion, an organization founded by World 
War I veterans in 1919 to promote greater awareness of 
veteran’s issues.30  During their September 1943 annual 
convention, American Legion leaders drafted what they 
called “a bill of rights for GI Joe and GI Jane,” 
proposed legislation that included education, 
unemployment benefits, employment services and home 
loans for veterans.31  With the help of the press -- 
and in particular the powerful publisher William 
Randolph Hearst, a key proponent of the plan -- the 
proposed legislation came to be known as the “GI Bill 
of Rights,” or simply the “GI Bill.”32 
 Signed into law by President Roosevelt on June 
22, 1944 –- just two weeks after the Allied landing at 
Normandy -- the educational provisions of the GI Bill, 
formally called the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 
                                                          
28
 See id. at 12. 
29
 See id. at 1-4. 
30
 See GREENBERG, THE GI BILL, supra note 16, at 11-12. 
31
 See id. at 12. 
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1944, differed from those recommended by the Osborn 
Committee in one very important respect.33  Rather than 
limit educational benefits to one year for all but a 
few select veterans, the GI Bill allowed veterans to 
attend the school of their choice for one year plus a 
period equal to the time the veteran had spent on 
active duty.34  Academic leaders met this provision 
with consternation; the presidents of both Harvard 
University and the University of Chicago expressed 
concern that veterans would diminish the educational 
quality at institutions of higher learning unless only 
those most qualified were admitted.35  Despite these 
reservations, when the war finally drew to a close in 
the summer of 1945, many veterans had earned up to 
four years of government-funded education. 
 What the GI Bill did retain was the Osborn 
Committee’s bias against debt financing of veteran 
education.  The GI Bill provided a generous $500 per 
year for tuition, books, supplies, equipment and other 
                                                                                                                                                              
32
 See id.; see also Michael J. Bennett, The Law That Worked, 75 
EDUC. REC., Fall 1994, at 13  (reviewing history of legislation). 
33
 Compare H.R. DOC. NO. 78-344, supra note 15, with Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub.L. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284. 
34
 See Servicemen’s Readjustment Act § 400(b). 
35
 See Keith W. Olson, The Astonishing Story: Veterans Make Good 
on the Nation’s Promise, EDUC. REC., Fall 1994, at 22-23 (citing 
James B. Conant, Annual Report of the President of the 
University, HARV. ALUMNI BULL., Feb. 3, 1945, at 286; Robert M. 
12 
 
necessary expenses, as well as a subsistence allowance 
of $50 per month for single veterans and $75 per month 
for veterans with dependents.36  Only a year after 
enacting the GI Bill, Congress increased this 
subsistence allowance to $65 per month for single 
veterans and $90 per month for veterans with 
dependents.37  Just three years after that, the 
allowance was increased to $75 for single veterans and 
up to $120 for married veterans with children.38  
Moreover, the GI Bill provided unemployed veterans a 
readjustment allowance of $20 per week for up to 52 
weeks.39  Popularly referred to as the 52-20 Club, the 
allowance gave veterans a “cool down” period to 
recover from the traumatic experience of war.40 
When the war ended in late 1945, veterans surged 
into schools across the country in unprecedented 
                                                                                                                                                              
Hutchins, The Threat to American Education, COLLIER’S, Dec. 30, 
1944, at 20-21). 
36
 See Serviceman’s Readjustment Act §400(b). 
37
 See ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 81ST CONG., REPORT ON EDUCATION AND 
TRAINING UNDER THE SERVICEMEN’S READJUSTMENT ACT, AS AMENDED 6 (Comm. Print 
1950) [hereinafter VETERANS ADMIN. REPORT]. 
38
 See id. at 8. 
39
 See Servicemen’s Readjustment Act § 403. 
40
 See GREENBERG, THE GI BILL, supra note 16, at 18; see also 
Interview with Francis X. Bellotti ’52, in Boston, Mass. at 6 
(Nov. 15, 2000) (on file with Boston College Law School Library).  
Although some critics thought the allowance would promote 
idleness in veterans, only nine million of the sixteen million 
eligible veterans applied for the funds, and then only for an 
average of seventeen weeks, far less than the fifty-two weeks 
authorized by the legislation.  See GREENBERG, THE GI BILL, supra 
note 16, at 18. 
13 
 
numbers.  Contrary to the modest predictions of the 
Osborn Committee, over 7.8 million veterans took 
advantage of the government program before the law 
expired in 1956: 2.2 million attended college; 3.5 
million went to business or trade schools; 1.4 million 
enrolled in on-the-job training programs; and 690,000 
received farm training.41  In 1950, the Veterans 
Administration (“VA”) reported that it had disbursed 
more than $8 billion to schools for tuition, books, 
and supplies; $2 billion had been disbursed in 1949 
alone.42  Schools scrambled to provide enough faculty, 
classrooms, and housing to accommodate returning 
veterans and their families.43 
 Their arrival came none too soon.  Although there 
is only one comprehensive study of the impact of the 
GI Bill on higher education,44 and no study about the 
impact of the GI Bill on legal education, it is clear 
that by 1945 many law schools were in dire straits 
financially.  In a 1948 retrospective on the 
                                                          
41
 See Bennett, supra note 32, at 8; GREENBERG, THE GI BILL, supra 
note 16, at 37; see also VETERANS ADMIN. REPORT, supra note 38, at 3 
(reporting that 6.5 million veterans had entered training by 
1950). 
42
 See VETERANS ADMIN. REPORT, supra note 38, at 3. 
43
 See generally GREENBERG, THE GI BILL, supra note 16. 
44
 See Milton Greenberg, The GI Bill: Reflections on the Past and 
Visions of the Future, EDUC. REC., Fall. 1994, at 57 (citing KEITH 
OLSON, THE GI BILL, THE VETERANS, AND THE COLLEGES (Univ. Press of 
14 
 
development of legal education, Harvard Law School 
Dean Erwin N. Griswold observed that “it should not be 
forgotten that there were nearly four years in which 
there were virtually no law school graduates.  From 
1942-1946 the law schools operated on a skeleton basis 
only, and there were many which were literally 
closed.”45 
Boston College Law School was no exception.  When 
Father Kenealy returned from wartime service as a U.S. 
Navy chaplain in December 1945, he surveyed a 
profoundly different scene from that of the pre-war 
years.  As early as 1942, enrollment had dwindled to 
143 students, with ninety-two of those students on 
leave.46  Many faculty members took leaves of absence 
from 1942 until the end of the war;47 Father Kenealy 
himself left from February 1943 until December 1945, 
during which time he was able to visit the law school 
only once for a week in March 1945.48  With only six 
graduates in June 1945, the law school’s finances grew 
so dire that the school was forced to relocate to 
                                                                                                                                                              
Kentucky, 1974) as the only major study of the history of the GI 
Bill ever undertaken). 
45
 Erwin N. Griswold, Law and Law School, in 2 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL 
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY SOURCES 719, 719 
(Steven Sheppard ed., 1999) (1948). 
46
 See SIMON, supra note 3, at 19. 
47
 See id. 
48
 See Moynihan et al., supra note 11, at A-1. 
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smaller accommodations at Eighteen Tremont Street in 
Boston the following autumn.49  The War-Time Report of 
the Faculty Advisory Committee, submitted to Father 
Kenealy upon his return, warned that these facilities 
would be inadequate when veterans returned from war, 
and might drive prospective students to other area law 
schools.50 
Regardless of the facilities, veterans filled the 
law school’s two classrooms in increasing numbers.  
The first year class of day students in September 1946 
enrolled with 159 students, more than ten times the 
size of the third year class of fifteen day students.51  
In 1947, veterans represented 86% of the student 
population, with 412 veterans taking classes during 
either the day or night sessions.52  Of those, 303 
veterans took classes full-time during the day 
session, while civilians enrolled predominantly in the 
evening session.53  By 1948, 504 veterans attended 
classes at Boston College Law School; and when the 
                                                          
49
 See SIMON, supra note 3, at 21. 
50
 See Moynihan et al., supra note 11, at A-14. 
51
 Compare BOSTON COLLEGE BULLETIN: THE LAW SCHOOL 46-49 (Apr. 1947), 
with id. at 52 [hereinafter 1947 BULLETIN]. 
52
 See id. at 58. 
53
 See id. (showing eighteen civilians in the day session and 
forty-three in the evening session). 
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veteran population peaked in 1949 at 623, roughly 90% 
of the total student population were veterans.54  
Inevitably, the presence of so many veterans in 
the law school classroom had an impact on the 
character of the law school itself -- and these older 
students returning from the battlefields of Europe, 
Africa and the Pacific brought a decidedly no-nonsense 
approach to legal education.55  Impatient to get on 
with their lives, veterans were especially attracted 
by the accelerated program, which allowed students to 
graduate in less than three years.56  Students in the 
accelerated program pursued a relentless schedule, 
attending classes through the summers, taking few 
holidays, and cramming a bar review into the evenings 
                                                          
54
 See BOSTON COLLEGE BULLETIN: THE LAW SCHOOL 62 (April 1948) 
[hereinafter 1948 BULLETIN]; BOSTON COLLEGE BULLETIN: THE LAW SCHOOL 55 
(April 1949) [hereinafter 1949 BULLETIN]. 
55
 See Interview with The Hon. James P. Lynch, Jr. ’49, in Newton, 
Mass. at 3 (Nov. 17, 2000); Interview with Francis X. Bellotti 
’52, supra note 40, at 5.  Recently, during a dispute over grade 
inflation at Harvard University, a Harvard dean made passing 
reference to unpublished research by Harvard President Neil 
Rudenstine that allegedly showed that the influx of veterans in 
colleges on the GI Bill led to grade inflation.  See Patrick 
Healy, Race, Gender Issues Stir Two Colleges: Professor’s Views 
‘False,’ Harvard Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 8, 2001, at B1.  Another 
professor at Harvard had suggested that grade inflation was the 
result of an influx of black students in the 1970s.  See id.  
Until that research becomes available, the politically and 
emotionally charged nature of that debate makes it difficult to 
credit those charges or counter-charges as any useful basis for 
fact. 
56
 See id. at 16; Interview with The Hon. James P. Lynch, Jr. ’49, 
supra note 55, at 3. 
17 
 
even as they attended classes during the day.57  The 
students themselves did not think the presence or 
impact of so many veterans remarkable in any way; 
indeed, the presence of civilians in the day school in 
the late 1940s seemed more remarkable to them.  As one 
alumnus recalled, “[i]f you didn’t go in the Army, if 
you were walking around as a civilian, you know, 
people were making fun of you.”58 
Perhaps the most dramatic and concrete effect of 
the massive influx of veterans was economic.  In 1941-
42, the law school held a reserve of approximately 
$32,000; by 1945, Father Kenealy returned to find that 
that amount had shrunk to a mere $1,693.59  Increasing 
tuition from $300 to $350 for the day session in 1947, 
and to $400 in 1948, the law school was able to 
rebuild its capital position.60  By 1948, the law 
                                                          
57
 See Interview with The Hon. James P. Lynch, Jr. ’49, supra note 
55, at 4; see also 1947 BULLETIN, supra note 51, at 16.  Although 
veterans were willing to undertake the grueling accelerated 
program, the law school finally discontinued it in June 1950, 
concluding that “[d]espite the mathematical total of courses, 
credits, and class hours . . . the law is too vast and difficult 
a field to be mastered in two years.” See 1947 BULLETIN, supra note 
51, at 16. 
58
 Interview with Francis X. Bellotti ’52, supra note 40, at 5. 
59
 See William J. Kenealy, S.J., General Report on the Condition 
of the Law School, Preliminary Report, Oct. 8, 1952, at 2 (on 
file at Boston College Burns Library) [hereinafter Kenealy, 
General Report]. 
60
 See 1947 BULLETIN, supra note 51, at 28; 1948 BULLETIN, supra note 
54, at 27.  The evening programs also saw tuition increases from 
$112.50 to $260, and then $300, between 1947 and 1948.  See 1947 
BULLETIN, supra note 51, at 28; 1948 BULLETIN, supra note 54, at 27. 
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school held more than $162,000 in reserve, and Father 
Kenealy began his plan to build Boston College Law 
School into a “truly great Catholic Law School of 
national reputation.”61  Father Kenealy proposed to 
build a premier law center outside of the dirty, busy 
confines of the city, adjacent to the Boston College 
campus at University Heights in the Boston suburb of 
Newton.62  With an estimated construction cost of 
$1,000,000, Father Kenealy thought he could raise 
$400,000 through tuition alone by 1952.63 
In fact, by 1952, the law school had surpassed 
all expectations, and held just over $516,000 for 
construction of a new facility.64  This money was 
raised largely through tuition increases; tuition at 
the law school between 1946 and 1949 increased by a 
roughly a third, with day session rates increasing 
from $300 to $400 annually, and evening session rates 
rising from $225 to $300 annually.65  This increase 
almost exactly mirrored tuition increases reported by 
                                                          
61
 See Kenealy, General Report, supra note 59, at 2; William J. 
Kenealy, S.J., Proposal to Construct a Campus Law School 
Building, in Kenealy, General Report, supra note 59, at C-5 
[hereinafter Kenealy, Proposal]. 
62
 See Kenealy, Proposal, supra note 61, at C-5. 
63
 See id. at C-10. 
64
 See Kenealy, General Report, supra note 59, at 2. 
65
 Compare BOSTON COLLEGE BULLETIN: THE LAW SCHOOL 23 (Apr. 1946) 
[hereinafter 1946 BULLETIN], with 1949 BULLETIN, supra note 49, at 
28. 
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professional schools across the country, which stood 
on average at twenty-nine percent.66  These tuition 
increases had little impact upon the veterans 
themselves; the increases fit comfortably within the 
GI Bill allowance of $500 for tuition, books and 
supplies, leaving veterans approximately $100 a year 
for books.67 
Economically, veterans returning to law school 
found themselves in pretty good shape.  Although over 
fifty percent of all World War II veterans had a 
family when they attended school, the subsistence 
allowance of up to $120 a month proved adequate to 
cover most family living expenses at a time when a 
family could rent an apartment in Jamaica Plain in 
Boston for just $33 a month. 68  In fact, the VA 
fretted that the generous allowances actually 
encouraged veterans to spend more time seeking 
education and training than required to facilitate 
their “readjustment” to civilian life.69  Those few 
students at Boston College Law School who could not 
cover their household expenses supplemented their 
                                                          
66
 See VETERANS ADMIN. REPORT, supra note 38, at 54. 
67
 See Servicemen’s Readjustment Act § 400(b). 
68
 See VETERANS ADMIN. REPORT, supra note 38, at 37; see Interview 
with Francis X. Bellotti ’52, supra note 40, at 6. 
69
 See id. at 8. 
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income by working during the day and attending the 
evening session.70 
With tuition and most living expenses paid, 
veterans left the law school unencumbered by debt.71  
“I didn’t have any money, but I didn’t have any 
debts,” quipped one alumnus.72  Although establishing a 
causal link between debt load and career choices is 
difficult and perhaps impossible, the classes that 
graduated in the late 1940s and early 1950s certainly 
fulfilled Boston College Law School’s stated purpose 
of preparing “young men and women of intelligence, 
industry, and character for careers of public service 
in the administration of justice” like few have either 
before or since.  The class of 1949, dubbed “the class 
the robes fell on” by Professor and later Judge Hiller 
B. Zobel, produced six judges, including Massachusetts 
Superior Court Chief Judge James P. Lynch, Jr.73  
Silvio O. Conte, another member of the class of 1949, 
represented Massachusetts in Congress for over thirty 
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years.74  The class of 1950 sent another nine judges to 
various benches in Massachusetts and the United 
States.75  Frank Bellotti, a member of the class of 
1952, went on to serve as Lieutenant Governor and 
later Attorney General for the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts.76 
 
II. The Korean GI Bill and the Migration of Veterans 
to the Boston College Law School Evening Program 
 
 By 1950, the number of World War II veterans 
attending institutions of higher education appeared to 
have peaked: the VA reported that 844,000 veterans 
were enrolled in college or post-graduate courses in 
1949, down from 1,158,000 in 1947.77  Even as the 
readjustment of World War II veterans drew down, 
however, the United States faced new demands for 
military manpower as the Cold War grew increasingly 
hot, particularly in Korea.78  The answer, ultimately, 
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was another draft.79  Congress now faced, however, the 
seeming inequity of providing benefits to World War II 
veterans while giving nothing to the young men who 
returned from Korea.  Carl R. Gray Jr., the 
Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, observed that the 
“concept of readjustment as embodied in the original 
[GI Bill] . . . . was supplanted by a broad program of 
education and training without regard to an 
affirmative showing of need for readjustment.”80  In 
short, educational benefits had become a veteran 
entitlement. 
 The original GI Bill had not been without its 
problems.81  As Congress prepared to draft new 
legislation for Korean War veterans, the VA submitted 
a report indicating where the greatest abuses had 
taken place.82  “There is ample evidence,” the report 
dryly stated, “to prove that efforts have been made in 
the past to obtain as much money as possible from the 
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Federal Government” through the GI Bill.83  Moreover, 
because the GI Bill provided that the VA pay directly 
to schools either the “customary cost of tuition” or 
“fair and reasonable compensation” if no customary 
tuition could be established, the VA found itself 
compelled to inquire far more deeply into the business 
dealings of various schools than its administrators 
might have preferred.84 
Determining the rate of tuition to be paid to 
each school was made even more complicated by the 
sheer number of schools the VA dealt with: almost 
40,800 educational institutions and more than 500,000 
job training schools.85  The fact that over 5,600 of 
the schools which operated for profit had been 
established after Congress passed the GI Bill aroused 
suspicion in the VA that many of those schools were 
designed simply to collect as much money from the 
federal government as possible.86 
The Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 
1952, popularly styled the “Korean GI Bill,”87 
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attempted to address these concerns by paying a single 
allowance to veterans for both tuition and 
subsistence.88  The VA applauded the measure, noting 
that “[t]he veteran has a stake in the amount he pays 
because it directly affects the amount that he is able 
to retain.”89  Despite a concerted effort by some 
members of Congress to overturn the provision and 
separate tuition from subsistence, single veterans 
enrolled at qualified schools continued to receive a 
single allowance of $90 per month, while those with 
families received between $110-130 depending upon the 
size of his family.90 
Those opposed to a single payment for both 
tuition and subsistence worried that veterans would be 
encouraged to attend lower-priced state schools, 
possibly compromising educational quality for a larger 
monthly payout for living expenses.91  Father Theodore 
M. Hesburgh, President of Notre Dame University, 
reported that his school had experienced a drastic 
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reduction in the number of veterans enrolled since the 
changes implemented for Korean War veterans.92  
Nevertheless, the powerful American Council on 
Education came out in favor of the change, arguing 
that any change in the law should wait for statistical 
indications of inequitable effects.93  Even the 
American Legion, which had been instrumental in the 
passage of the first GI Bill eight years prior and 
originally had opposed the combination of tuition and 
subsistence, argued against separating the two 
payments.94 
Korean War veterans were a substantially 
different group from those who had served during World 
War II.  They were much younger; the average age of 
Korean War veterans using the Korean GI Bill was just 
twenty-three, five years younger than the average age 
of World War II veterans using the original GI Bill.95  
There were far fewer Korean War veterans; in 1953, 
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only 1.8 million veterans were eligible for the Korean 
GI Bill, compared to the over 15 million eligible 
veterans from World War II.96  Finally, the veterans of 
World War II and the Korean War who had been drafted 
had been drafted differently; while military service 
during World War II was almost universal, a complex 
system of deferments evolved during the Korean War for 
young men attending college or pursuing post-graduate 
studies.97 
Although the Selective Service reported in 1951 
that college students could only postpone induction 
until the end of the academic year, in reality 
students could delay induction for a substantially 
longer period of time.98  Concerned that the United 
States would lose promising young scientists and 
engineers to war, intellectuals like J.R. Oppenheimer 
urged the federal government to exempt undergraduate 
                                                                                                                                                              
Commission, the American Legion), with VETERANS ADMIN. REPORT, supra 
note 38, at 37. 
96
 Compare Separation of Subsistence, supra note 87, at 1523 
(statement of Cecil H. Munson, Chief, Vocational Training and 
Education for the National Rehabilitation Commission, the 
American Legion), with VETERANS ADMIN. REPORT, supra note 38, at 3. 
97
 See GEORGE Q. FLYNN, THE DRAFT, 1940-1973, at 125, 142-43, 150 
(1993). 
98
 Compare OFFICE OF SELECTIVE SERVICE RECORDS, supra note 78, at 30, 
with FLYNN, supra note 97, at 142; CARL R. PETERSON JR., AVOIDANCE AND 
EVASION OF MILITARY SERVICE: AN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1626-1973, at 119-21 
(1998). 
27 
 
and graduate students in the sciences.99  Ultimately, 
the federal government settled on a broader deferment 
for all college students who either finished in the 
top half of their class or performed well on a 
national examination.100  Designed by the Educational 
Testing Service, the same organization that developed 
the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), the Selective 
Service College Qualification Test (SSCQT) allowed 
those who scored a seventy or seventy-five to defer 
induction until they completed their studies.101  As a 
practical matter, these deferments allowed those who 
possessed the resources and the talent to delay 
military service indefinitely.102 
The Korean War veterans arriving at Boston 
College Law School in the early 1950s came to a law 
school radically transforming itself.  The profits 
from the boom years of the first GI Bill, and the 
continuing flow of GI tuition money, gave Father 
Kenealy the funds he needed to break ground on a new 
building at the Boston College campus in Newton.  The 
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law school announced its ambitious million dollar 
construction program in 1953;103 St. Thomas More Hall 
was completed just one year later.104  Dedicated by 
Archbishop Cushing on September 27, 1954, the new 
building boasted everything the old facilities at 
Eighteen Tremont Street lacked -- an excellent 
library, spacious classrooms, dedicated space for a 
law review, and a moot court room.105 
Even as the law school prepared to move from its 
downtown location, an interesting demographic shift in 
the student body was occurring.  In 1952, veterans far 
outnumbered civilians in both the day school, 166 to 
106, and the evening school, 195 to 32.106  The very 
next year, civilians enrollment overtook veteran 
enrollment in the day school, 145 to 91.107  At the 
same time, however, veteran enrollment in the evening 
school as a percentage of total veteran enrollment at 
the law school dramatically increased, from 38% in 
1951 to 64% in 1953.108  Veteran enrollment in the 
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evening program would remain between approximately 160 
and 170 students for the remainder of the decade, and 
veterans significantly outnumbered civilians in the 
evening program.109  Meanwhile, civilians continued to 
outnumber veterans in the day program.110 
Although there may be no single explanation to 
the preference of Korean War veterans for the evening 
program, one major factor was probably the cost of 
tuition.111  In 1952, Father Kenealy candidly 
acknowledged that registration at law schools across 
the country was down as a result of the twin effect of 
the exhaustion of benefits under the original GI Bill 
and the draft for the Korean War.112  After several 
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years at an annual rate of $400, in 1952 tuition at 
Boston College Law School increased to $480 a year for 
the day school and $360 a year for the evening 
program.113  Tuition crept up to $560 a year for the 
day program and $420 a year for the evening program in 
1954.114  By 1959, tuition stood at $900 for the day 
program and $675 for the evening program.115 
These tuition increases cut deeply into the 
combined tuition and subsistence allowance given to 
veterans.  Unlike the first GI Bill, which paid an 
annual amount for tuition, the Korean GI Bill only 
paid during the months that a veteran was actually 
enrolled in class.116  Thus, an unmarried Korean War 
veteran who attended the day program at Boston College 
Law School received the $110 allowance from September 
until April, for a total of $880 a year.  Benefits may 
not even have been that generous; Walter Wekstein, a 
Korean War veteran and graduate of the Boston College 
Law School class of 1958, recalls that the Korean GI 
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Bill allowance exactly matched his tuition bill.117  To 
make ends meet, Mr. Wekstein, who was a student in the 
day school and member of the law review, worked a 
full-time job in addition to his other obligations.118  
His industry was perhaps exceptional; and as an 
unmarried veteran, Mr. Wekstein did not have as many 
family obligations as some of his classmates. 
Perhaps more representative of the plight of 
Korean War veterans was Warren B. Rudman, former 
senator from New Hampshire, a graduate of the class of 
1960.  Senator Rudman, a married combat veteran from 
Korea who commuted to the evening program from his day 
job managing a family furniture factory in New 
Hampshire, found that by the late 1950s the Korean GI 
Bill only “partially covered my tuition expenses.”119  
Despite congressional intent that the Korean GI Bill 
educational benefits cover both tuition and 
subsistence, by the late 1950s the cost of tuition 
alone at Boston College Law School exceeded the entire 
benefit.  The migration of veterans from the day 
school to the night school corresponded quite closely 
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with the erosion of the Korean GI Bill’s purchasing 
power, arguably because more and more veterans found 
themselves forced to work during the day to support 
themselves and their families. 
To be sure, Boston College Law School graduates 
of that time continued to distinguish themselves in 
public service.  One of the most colorful mayors in 
the history of the City of Boston, Kevin H. White, 
graduated from the law school in 1955.120  Margaret M. 
Heckler, a graduate of the Class of 1956, represented 
Massachusetts in the U.S. House of Representatives for 
several terms.121  Thomas P. Salmon, who graduated from 
Boston College Law School only a year behind 
Congresswoman Heckler and two years behind Mayor 
White, went on to serve as Vermont’s governor.122  The 
classes of the late 1950s never achieved the same 
number of judicial positions as their predecessors in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s, however; the classes 
in the late 1950s consistently produced three or four 
judges, peaking in 1957 with five.123 
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Father Kenealy had warned as early as 1948 that a 
move to Newton would probably spell the end of the 
evening program, as students would not make the trek 
out from Boston to attend classes after work.124  He 
added, however, that the loss of revenue and students 
would be more than made up by the enhanced reputation 
the law school would enjoy through improved academic 
offerings.125  By 1963, seven years into the tenure of  
a new dean, Reverend Robert F. Drinan, S.J., the law 
school had achieved a measure of success in its quest 
for national stature.  In that year, the law school 
announced that it would no longer accept students in 
the evening program.126  The move coincided closely 
with the expiration of Korean GI Bill benefits, and 
closed an era of unparalleled opportunity, growth and 
success at Boston College Law School. 
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III. The Impact of the GI Bill on Legal Education 
at Boston College Law School 
 
The GI Bill increased awareness of the normally 
prohibitive cost of legal education, as noted by 
Harvard Law School Dean Erwin N. Griswold in 1948: 
The great increase in applications during this 
post-war period, thanks to G.I. money available, 
shows very clearly that in normal times the cost 
of legal education is a substantial deterrent to 
many well-qualified men . . . . It may well be 
asked whether this is desirable.  It is contrary 
to most of our professed notions . . . . The 
question may well be asked whether we should not 
find some means to continue such a program on 
some scale so that well qualified young men may 
not be denied the opportunity of a legal 
education.127 
 
Indeed, there were over 40,000 veterans enrolled in 
law school in 1947, an untold number of whom probably 
never would have been able to enter the profession 
otherwise.128  Ironically, although the GI Bill would 
be heralded fifty years later as the engine of post-
war recovery and American industrial success,129 the 
federal government worried in 1950 that professional 
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occupations might become supersaturated with GI Bill 
graduates.130 
 Left unanswered, however, was Dean Griswold’s 
question: how can well qualified students be afforded 
an opportunity to obtain a legal education in the face 
of often prohibitive tuition costs?  As early as 1943, 
the Osborn Committee recognized that debt financed 
education could dampen the enthusiasm of many students 
for education.131  The original GI Bill encouraged 
students to pursue their studies without worrying 
about how to pay for school, books, and room and 
board.132  All of the Boston area law schools -- 
including Boston College Law School -- profited 
handsomely from the arrangement, building a strong 
foundation for future excellence.133  Yet, even as 
veteran benefits tapered off in the late 1950s, Boston 
                                                                                                                                                              
class they always thought themselves as being – but all too 
seldom were.”). 
130
 See VETERANS ADMIN. REPORT, supra note 38, at 39.  The report 
observed that professionals comprised only four percent of all 
workers in pre-war America, while over thirty-five percent of all 
GI Bill graduates received professional training.  See id. at 39 
tbl. 1. 
131
 See supra notes 15-76 and accompanying text. 
132
 See supra notes 15-76 and accompanying text. 
133
 Table one provides a breakdown of the tuition at the leading 
law schools in Boston during the period 1947-1960, culled from 
the annual report of the ABA’s Section of Legal Education and 
Admission to the Bar.  See Law Schools and Bar Admission 
Requirements in the United States, 1947-60 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL ED. & 
ADMISSION TO THE BAR at 9, 16. 
36 
 
College Law School –- along with many other law 
schools –- continued to increase tuition. 
 Explaining the decision to increase tuition 
during that period, Father Drinan states that he is 
“inclined to think that BC Law School was under the 
national or regional tuition at that time.”134  In 
fairness, tuition at Boston College Law School never 
exceeded the average cost of law school tuition at 
leading schools in Boston during the 1950s -- although 
it never dipped too far below, either.135  The evening 
program at Boston College Law School also provided 
students access to an increasingly prestigious, high 
quality law school at comparatively cheap rates.136  
After tuition and cost-of-living expenses outstripped 
Korean GI Bill benefits in the mid-1950s, a 
disproportionate number of veterans migrated from the 
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day school to the evening program.137  It seems 
reasonable to believe that veterans worked during the 
day to finance their legal education, supplementing 
their benefits and avoiding debt in the process.  
After the evening program ended at Boston College Law 
School in the early 1960s, access to affordable and 
high quality education in Boston was significantly 
curtailed. 
 Father Drinan notes that the quality of the 
evening program simply could not keep up with that of 
the day program at Boston College in the early 
1960s.138  “The day school was reaching out across the 
country and was attracting a very significant number 
of very superior students,” he adds.139  Perhaps it 
might be asked if the only mission of Boston College 
Law School -- or any law school, for that matter -- 
ought properly to be confined to attracting and 
educating top students.140  If social justice is a 
component of the Boston College Law School mission, 
shouldn’t the school’s resources be directed toward 
encouraging talented students to pursue careers in 
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social justice?  More generally, if the legal 
profession’s aspirational statements emphasize service 
to the community and the poor, shouldn’t all law 
schools attempt to make access to legal education as 
wide-spread and affordable as possible?141 
Despite Dean Griswold’s admonition less than two 
decades earlier, none of the Boston area law schools 
pondered these questions as legal education became 
less affordable in the early 1960s.  Although it is 
difficult to define with any precision what legal 
positions are truly in the “public interest,” it seems 
uncontroversial to suggest that those who don the 
robes of a judge render a public service.  By that 
standard, Boston College Law School proved slightly 
more successful in its stated goal in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, when it eventually placed between 
five and ten judges from each class on the bench, than 
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it did in the late 1950s, when at most only five 
graduates in any year have ever accepted one of the 
most honored positions in the legal profession.142 
 Nor has any Boston area law school wrestled with 
these issues since that time.  Debt financing became 
an increasingly large component of American higher 
education throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s.  
Satisfied with the success of the original GI Bill and 
Korean GI Bill, politicians toyed with the idea of a 
comprehensive scheme to fund higher education.143  A 
commission chartered by President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
in 1956 recommended more scholarships and “greater 
reliance on student borrowing.”144  This unfocused 
national dialogue took on renewed urgency, however, in 
October 1957, when Russia launched Sputnik, beating 
the United States into outer space.145  In short order, 
Congress passed the National Defense Education Act, 
authorizing federal funding of loans to students of up 
to $1,000 for five years at a mere three percent 
interest.146  By June 1960, Congress had authorized 
approximately $70.8 million for federal education loan 
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programs.147  Education institutions heartily endorsed 
this and other expansions of the role of the federal 
government in underwriting student loans, citing 
increased costs in facilities, faculty and 
equipment.148  Less than fifty years after the federal 
government offered its first student loans, federal 
funding for student loans stood at $14.6 billion for 
FY 2000 alone.149  
Debt financing of education forces law students 
to make a difficult choice: either allocate a large 
percentage of income from lower-paying public service 
jobs to maintain and pay down student loan debt, or 
enter the higher paying field of private law.  For 
example, a 2001 graduate of Boston College Law School 
who borrows the full amount of $23,500 available 
annually through federally guaranteed loans will 
graduate with $70,500 of debt.  With tuition alone set 
at $25,790 per year, such a debt load would not be an 
uncommon.  This debt requires monthly payments of 
roughly $881.25 to pay down over a ten year period, 
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using the rule of thumb of approximately $125 per 
month for every $10,000 owed.  This represents 42% of 
the after-tax monthly income of an entry-level 
assistant district attorney in Massachusetts, who 
makes only $30,000 annually.150  By contrast, these 
repayments comprise only 12% of the monthly after-tax 
income of an entry-level associate at a large Boston 
area law firm, who commands a salary of $125,000.  A 
risk-averse student is more likely to at the very 
least delay entry into the public interest field until 
that debt is paid down. 
 If this Article stands for the unremarkable 
proposition that students wish to avoid debt, and that 
significant debt may have an impact on future career 
choices, then it is all the more remarkable that this 
proposition is only just being rediscovered in the 
twenty-first century.  For example, Princeton 
University recently announced that its incoming 
undergraduate class of 2002 will not be required to 
borrow any money to finance their education.151  
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Instead, once parental share of tuition has been 
computed, financial aid applicants will receive 
university grants in place of student loans.152  Before 
this program, with the cost of tuition and room and 
board exceeding $33,000 annually, Princeton 
undergraduates were leaving the school with an average 
debt load of $15,000-$20,000.153  The director of 
undergraduate financial aid at Princeton states that 
the university hopes that by eliminating this debt 
load, graduating students will avoid early financial 
hardship and will have greater freedom in making 
decisions about graduate education and careers.154 
 In the context of legal education, New York 
University (NYU) School of Law Dean John Sexton is 
widely known for his dramatic fundraising efforts, and 
                                                                                                                                                              
aid.htm (Jan. 27, 2001); see also Out from Under, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Feb. 8, 2001, at A22. 
152
 See Marks, supra note 151. 
153
 See id. 
154
 See id.  Other undergraduate universities have not yet followed 
suit, but market pressures to attract top students almost 
certainly will force them to do so.  See Out from Under, supra 
note 151, at A22.  Intuitively, one might think that a 
substantial reduction in student debt would increase the ability 
of schools to appeal to alumni for contributions.  The lessons of 
the Boston College Law School classes of 1949-59 are mixed in 
that regard.  Classes in the late 1940s and early 1950s -- those 
who enjoyed fully-funded GI Bill education -- tend on average to 
give less overall than classes in the late 1950s, although the 
Class of 1950 gave the second highest amount during that decade, 
with $345,458 in lifetime giving.  Table two provides a summary 
of alumni lifetime giving by class during this decade.  I am 
indebted to Louise Parent and Al Blum at the Boston College Law 
School Office of Alumni and Development for making this 
information available. 
43 
 
his ambition to make NYU’s J.D. program tuition-
free.155  Dean Sexton recently stated that, “In my 
view, every student should be able to make a career 
choice free of debt.”156  While he has backed off his 
original proposal to make legal education free to all 
-- including those students electing to enter the 
high-end salary brackets -- Dean Sexton continues to 
support the idea of a loan repayment program that 
would substantially reduce or eliminate student loan 
debt, and has implemented such a program at his law 
school.157 
 The overarching lesson of the experiences of 
World War II and Korean War veterans at Boston College 
Law School appears to be that students will make every 
effort to avoid debt.  Freedom from debt, in turn, 
assures freedom of career choice.  Law schools can 
give students that freedom by dramatically expanding 
financial aid packages, the model adopted by the 
original GI Bill, or by offering less expensive 
evening education, the model implicitly imposed at 
Boston College Law School by the Korean GI Bill and 
increasing daytime tuition. 
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To simply look back over fifty years of history 
and criticize the decisions of those in positions of 
leadership at the time is too easy, unhelpful, and 
smacks of ingratitude.  The visionary work of Father 
Kenealy and Father Drinan at Boston College Law School 
during the 1940s and 1950s fundamentally transformed 
the law school for the better, and improved the lives 
of countless students in that generation and those 
that followed.  At the same time, now that Boston 
College Law School commands a position among the top-
ranked law schools in the country, should it not 
capitalize on that position to continue its tradition 
of public service? 
Although Boston College Law School’s capital 
position is improving each year, it is many years away 
from the luxury of an endowment like that of Princeton 
University.  An aggressive financial aid program is 
likely too expensive a proposition for the law school 
at this date.  On the other hand, the law school might 
easily offer an evening program, as it did for many 
years.  Whatever factors may have contributed to the 
closing of the evening program almost forty years ago, 
the law school stands in a considerably different 
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position now.  First, an evening program would not 
harm the reputation of the school -- the law school’s 
ranking is reasonably assured, and even prestigious 
law programs like Georgetown University Law Center 
offer evening degrees today.  Second, an evening 
program could draw on the rich resources of the Boston 
legal community, perhaps expanding the use of adjunct 
professors, who receive only $2,500 per semester.  In 
short, Boston College Law School should consider 
making affordable, high quality legal education 
available once again, so that another generation can 
fulfill Dean Dooley’s vision of a law school that 
allows working students to realize their ambitions to 
leave their daily jobs to practice law anywhere in the 
country. 
Conclusion 
 Almost seventy-five years ago, Boston College Law 
School was established to provide a place of learning 
for those devoted to a career of public service.  The 
original GI Bill and the World War II veterans who 
brought those funds to the school had a profound 
impact upon Boston College Law School.  They provided 
the resources to transform a good regional school into 
what is today a nationally ranked law school.   
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Only ten years later, however Boston College Law 
School -- and for that matter, law schools across the 
country -- failed to recognize that tuition and cost-
of-living expenses were outstripping the ability of 
students to pay.  The effect was even more pronounced, 
and perhaps prolonged, at Boston College Law School, 
where Korean War veterans found themselves forced to 
choose between day school and debt or night school and 
post-graduation freedom to choose a career path.  When 
the night school closed in the early 1960s, even that 
avenue became unavailable.   
Debt financing of legal education has been the 
model ever since.  If public service is indeed an 
aspiration of the legal profession in general, and 
Boston College Law School in particular, however, 
perhaps law schools should consider offering an 
expanded financial aid package or a less expensive 
evening program so that students will have the 
broadest possible freedom in choosing their career 
paths.  Unburdened by debt, graduating students might 
better fulfill the aspirations of their profession and 
their law schools. 
